

Air Assault Operations of the 101st Airborne Division

During Operation Desert Storm

February 24 - 28, 1991

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IOAC 4-91
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Spearheaded by its Republican Guard Corps, Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. It looked as if the Iraqis might continue their attack into Saudi Arabia. On August 10, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) was alerted for deployment to Saudi Arabia (Naylor, 10). At that time the Division Ready Force was 1st Battalion, 502d Infantry. I was the S-3 (Air) for that battalion. I was in the process of clearing to attend IOAC on August 28. With the thought of a quick Gulf War, I did like many others and had my orders cancelled.

The deployment seemed to drag on. The initial air frames went to logistical assets and command elements from the division. The priority then shifted to 3rd Battalion, 502d Infantry. On September 1, I departed for Saudi Arabia with the last of the battalion's soldiers. We expected a war to start shortly after we arrived in Saudi Arabia. It did not. We had plenty of time to prepare for the war.

It was the first time since the war in Vietnam that the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) planned and executed air assault operations in a combat situation. For this reason, politics and public relations influenced the planning as much as tactical considerations did. The operation had to be big. On the first day of the ground war, 1st Brigade established a forward operating base (FOB) Cobra, ninety-three miles inside Iraq. On the second and third day of the ground war, 3rd Brigade air assaulted to an area of operations (AO) Eagle, about sixty miles from Baghdad. (See map, division operations). The final operation involved 2d Brigade establishing FOB Viper, about ninety miles east of FOB Cobra, on the fourth day of the ground

war. The division gained much of its publicity from these air assaults during the brief ground war. The greatest challenge to us was not the ground war, however. The challenge had been in waiting for the ground war.

Boredom was the one aspect of warfare that we had not trained ourselves to deal with. It was like an ever-present enemy. For nearly six months, we had been in Saudi Arabia just waiting for some type of military action to relieve the monotony. We had too much time on our hands with too little to do. Most of us had difficulty adapting to the extremely slow pace. The soldiers amused themselves in a variety of ways. Some would throw scorpions and camel spiders into a small arena for gladiatorial contests. One of our men even shaved his eyebrows out of boredom. Card games and board games were quite common. There had been much conjecture about when and if a war would start. Rumors infected the battalion daily. Morale was not high. Fortunately, all of the available time did give us the opportunity to train and plan for the conduct of a war in the desert.

In one way, my battalion (1st Battalion, 502d Infantry) had been lucky. (See division task organization). In March of 1990, along with 3/101 and 9/101 Aviation, we participated in a rotation at the National Training Center (NTC) with a brigade from the 24th ID. Because most command billets were frozen at the beginning of Operation Desert Shield, those same three battalion commanders, with recent NTC experience, commanded during the ground war. Additionally, some of the air assault

lessons we learned at the NTC, were applied rather than forgotten.

The principal factor affecting helicopter operations in the desert is a condition called "brown-out." This condition forces pilots to land by their instruments because the sand stirred up by their rotor blades reduces their visibility to zero. Our experience at the National Training Center taught us that the best way to reduce the amount of sand one helicopter kicked up from affecting subsequent aircraft was to increase the distance between the helicopters and have them land in echelon formation. Because of the increased distances between aircraft, five helicopters per pickup zone (PZ) was the most a battalion could control.

After several months of changing missions and choosing different objectives, the division's final plan called for a Brigade Task Force (1st Brigade and 1/502d) to secure a forward operating base, called FOB Cobra, at the beginning of the ground war, to provide a logistical base that could support follow-on operations. The division's attack helicopters would fly armed reconnaissance of the flight routes in and out of FOB Cobra for seven days prior to the start of the ground war (G-DAY). The original projection put G-Day on February 21, so the reconnaissance began on February 14. During what became ten days of reconnaissance, the OH-58D helicopters made video tapes of the flight routes and potential sites for FOB Cobra.

In addition to helping finalize the plan, the purpose of the reconnaissance was to eliminate any pockets of resistance.

Throughout this time, an infantry platoon was on strip alert to provide security for any DART (Downed Aircraft Recovery Team) missions, in the event any helicopter went down in Iraq due to enemy fire or mechanical difficulties. On February 17, 1st Platoon, Company C from 1/502d IN was on strip alert. When ten Iraqis made attempts to surrender to some AH-64 Apache helicopters, aircraft were dispatched to get 1st Platoon. The ten Iraqis were picked up by five Pathfinders in helicopters from 2/17th Cavalry. However, more Iraqis were spotted, and the platoon was sent to a bunker complex about fifteen miles inside Iraq (MT 275910). Using AH-64 Apaches in overwatch, the platoon netted thirty-one enemy prisoners-of-war, (EPW's) (Glover, 7).

Three days later, AH-1 Cobras from 3rd Battalion, 101st Aviation, with AH-64 Apaches from 2nd Battalion, 229th Aviation, and Air Force A-10's attacked another bunker complex. Company B from 1st Battalion, 187th Infantry, went in to secure the surrendering Iraqis. The bunker complex (later call Objective Toad) turned out to be larger than expected, and the other two rifle companies from the battalion were called in. They captured a total of 435 EPW's.

The reconnaissance of the flight routes (later called MSR Newmarket) and of potential sites for an operating base, finally confirmed a location for FOB Cobra. FOB Cobra itself would comprise about sixty square miles of featureless desert (Chadwick, 84). It was divided up so the infantry would occupy the outer perimeter and the support units would be closer to the center. (See graphics of FOB Cobra).

For lift operations during the ground war, the seats were taken out of the Black Hawks and Kevlar blankets were laid on the floors. This reduced the allowable cargo load (ACL) to 5000 lbs. or fifteen combat-loaded infantrymen. The ACL on the Chinooks was 18,000 lbs. This ACL permitted two XM966 TOW HMMWV's with a crew of four and seven TOW missiles each to be lifted. The Chinook loads on the 1/502d PZ were internal. It took about thirty minutes to load the HMMWV's in the Chinooks. On PZ C-4, we loaded the four TOW HMMWV's from 5th Platoon, Company D, along with one U.S. Air Force Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) HMMWV; a cargo HMMWV, with two vehicle radios plus medical supplies; and two scout motorcycles. (See PZ Diagram, FOB Cobra).

Under 1st Brigade PZ control, 2d and 3rd Platoons of Company D, 1/502d, prepared their TOW vehicles for sling-loading "shotgun" style. The normal procedure for tandem sling-loads was to attach the two HMMWV's together, bumper-to-bumper with a Yo-He device. The "shotgun" technique put the HMMWV's side-by-side. This allowed the Chinooks to fly lower and faster than with a Yo-He slingload.

While most of the soldiers moved into PZ posture, those soldiers and vehicles not flying by helicopter to FOB Cobra, moved to an assembly area to prepare for a ground convoy under the control of the Battalion Executive Officer. This convoy was part of a larger 1st Brigade convoy called Task Force Citadel, which contained a total of 722 vehicles. The convoys moved along MSR Newmarket to FOB Cobra.

In addition to the threat of chemical agents, the intelligence summaries reported that the Iraqis had the capability of employing the anthrax virus. The Iraqis had modified civilian vehicles to clandestinely dispense the virus. There was an increased threat of anthrax in the Euphrates River Valley. I am not certain when the decision was made to vaccinate the division's soldiers. The problem was in obtaining the vaccine, though. As February 23 drew to a close, the medical platoon made a hurried attempt to vaccinate all of the soldiers for anthrax on the PZ's.

H-Hour was scheduled for 0600 hours on February 24, (G-Day). The 1/502d pick-up zones (PZ's) corresponded to the same LZ numbers, with Company A going to LZ 10 (MU 952634), Company B with the battalion's mortars going to LZ 11 (MU935590), and Company C headed for LZ 12 (MU 907567). After securing our portion of FOB Cobra, we had to integrate follow-on forces from 2d Brigade into the 1st Brigade perimeter and be prepared for upcoming missions within forty-eight hours. (See 1/502d graphics, FOB Cobra).

Late in the evening on February 23, under cover of darkness, helicopters inserted four long-range surveillance teams from 2/17th CAV on to FOB Cobra (Naylor, 12). As the morning of February 24 broke, it became obvious that H-Hour would have to be delayed. There was a heavy ground fog near the PZ, and the attack helicopter pilots flying route reconnaissance and LZ overwatch, reported even heavier fog on FOB Cobra. H-Hour was moved to 0700 hours. The fog did not lift, so the 1st Brigade Commander bumped H-Hour to 0800 hours. At 0700 hours, three

teams of Pathfinders equipped with beacons were inserted along the flight routes to help guide the helicopters. Visibility did not improve much, but rather than delay H-Hour again, the 1st Brigade Commander decided to proceed and "fly slowly." At 0725 hours, the first lift consisting of 67 Black Hawks, 30 Chinooks, and 10 UH-1 Iroquois or "Hueys" began its way towards FOB Cobra.

This began the largest air assault in history. It involved over 300 helicopters of attack, utility, and cargo classifications. The establishment of FOB Cobra, 75 nautical miles inside Iraq, represented the deepest penetration of any coalition force on the first day of the ground war. After the helicopters carried the infantrymen to FOB Cobra, those same helicopters returned about an hour-and-a-half later to fly in the remaining soldiers and supplies.

The air assault into FOB Cobra went according to plan for the 1st Brigade Task Force. The navigation of the pilots was extremely good, partly because the lead helicopters in each serial were equipped with global positioning systems (GPS's or "sluggers"). Once on the objective, the soldiers quickly reorganized and established hasty fighting positions. The soldiers initially had to abandon their heavy rucksacks on the LZ and later retrieved them with the help of the TOW HMMWV's. The scouts on motorcycles acted as couriers and used a slugger to get accurate positions of the various units.

Although there were few surprises for my battalion, it was a different case for Company A, 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry. The AH-64 Apaches on route security spotted enemy on Company A's LZ.

The LZ was shifted to an alternate LZ, two kilometers to the south. As the men unloaded the helicopters, they were greeted by AH-1 Cobras and A-10's pounding the Iraqi position to their north. The Company Commander led his forward observers to a position near the Iraqi bunker complex. They were able to direct accurate artillery fire on the Iraqis. After a period of being pounded by 105mm artillery, the Iraqis surrendered. Company A took 339 Iraqi prisoners (Naylor, 14).

For the remainder of the day, Chinooks and Black Hawks continued to fly in fuel and supplies. A rapid refuel point was established for the helicopters. This filling station would be key to future operations.

On the second day of the ground war (G+1), 3rd Brigade began its assault into the Euphrates River Valley to an area called A0 (Area of Operations) Eagle. Its objective was to interdict Iraqi movement along on Highway 8, about 60 miles southeast of Baghdad (Steele, 30). This became the northern most point any allied force moved during the war. Before 3d Brigade could finish its assault, a sandstorm or shamal hit the area and grounded the helicopters. On G+2 the weather abated, and 3rd Brigade finished their move to A0 Eagle. The distance from 3rd Brigade's location in Tactical Assembly Area (TAA) Campbell, on the Saudi border, to A0 Eagle was about 155 statute miles. Helicopters returning from A0 Eagle had to refuel in FOB Cobra before proceeding to TAA Campbell.

Late in the day of February 26, under cover of darkness, 4/101 AVN flew into 1/502d IN Battalion's sector and landed

without external lighting. Our battalion staff had no clear idea what the next mission would be. The Black Hawk pilots were just as uninformed as we were.

At 2335 hours, the 2d Brigade TOC sent us a message that the next mission would be to establish FOB Viper, about ninety statute miles due east of FOB Cobra. The mission would also include 3rd Battalion, 502d Infantry, and 3rd Battalion, 327th Infantry. H-Hour would be at 1000 hours, and the air mission brief would be at 0600 hours, G+3. With so little information to go on, the staff issued the companies an operations order at 0330 hours. The companies moved into PZ posture before sunrise.

At the air mission briefing, H-Hour was moved up to 0900 hours. Aviation Brigade neglected to inform the pilots from 4/101 AVN about the briefing, and they did not attend. Some of the battalion's HMMWV's had to move to a PZ controlled by the artillery battalion. These vehicles were to be flown in by CH-47 Chinooks. All Chinook loads would be internal to give the aircraft greater evasive capabilities. Flight speed for the Black Hawks would be 120 knots. In many respects, this mission mirrored the operation into FOB Cobra.

The pilots from 4/101 AVN were hastily briefed on the PZ. The only change the companies made to their plan was to have the first lift of infantry go in without their rucksacks, and the second lift of resupplies and reinforcements would bring in all of the rucksacks and leave them on the LZ. Despite the thousands of maps that the S-2 section was transporting, there was only a couple of maps of the objective area. The Company Commanders

simply drew grid squares on blank sheets of papers and updated these as unit locations became available. Despite the lack of deliberate planning time, the air assault to secure FOB Viper went well. The helicopters inserting Company C, 1/502d IN, landed amongst cluster munitions that British Tornados had dropped, but the men were able to move out of the minefield safely.

Once the battalion was on the ground, the soldiers again quickly established a defensive perimeter, dug hasty fighting positions, and began local patrolling. Company A was in the northwest, while Company B was center sector with the Battalion Mortars and Battalion Headquarters. Company C was located in the southeastern part of the battalion's sector. Company D screened to the front and flanks.

Although there were only a few enemy soldiers on FOB Viper, there was an overabundance of arms and ordinance. Apparently, deserting Iraqi Republican Guards had sold weapons to the local Bedouins. In addition to unexploded coalition weapons, the rifle companies found many Iraqi mortar rounds, RPG-7 grenades, and land mines. The battalion's Battlefield Intelligence Coordination Center Officer (BICC) and the battalion interrogator visited the various Bedouins in the area, established a type of alliance with them, and collected the Iraqi weapons from them.

A heavy stream of supplies and personnel continued to flow into FOB Viper. The Battalion Staff began planning for future operations. The next operation called for 2d Brigade to seize the airport to the northwest of Basra to establish an airhead. One battalion would establish a blocking position to

cut-off the retreating Iraqi Army. At 0100 hours on February 28, the Brigade TOC sent a message that there would be a possible cease-fire at 0500 hours. The convoy of vehicles arrived at FOB Viper at first light on the twenty-eighth. Later that day, the vehicles which did not get lifted from the artillery PZ the day before, finally arrived by CH-47. The battalion remained at FOB Viper until redeploying to Saudi Arabia by helicopter on March 3.

Although the 101st is supposed to be an air assault division, there are not enough helicopters. The Black Hawk Battalions are all understrength with only two companies, each. During each air assault, we had to mass all three medium lift battalions to move one infantry brigade. In addition to the limited number of helicopters, the allowable cargo load further reduced our lift capabilities. The Black Hawk is rated to carry twenty-two infantrymen when its seats are removed. The Kevlar blanket weighs 500 lbs., which reduces the ACL. Despite months of playing with the soldier's load, we never did train our men to survive off of their LCE's for 24-48 hours. Sitting on rucksacks that weighed too much to carry off of the LZ's, the men further reduced the ACL of the Black Hawks to fifteen soldiers. We should have put eighteen or nineteen infantrymen, without rucksacks on each Black Hawk with two drag-bags of ammunition. This would have allowed us to move three companies, instead of two, on the first lift. The second lift would then require fewer aircraft to bring in resupplies.

Another lesson deals with internal versus external loads. The "shotgun" technique proved very effective for external loads.

However, external loads reduce both the air speed and the maneuverability of helicopters. The heavy lift pilots finally opted to trade increased loading time for increased survivability. This is why all vehicles flown into FOB Viper were internal loads.

The final issue involves luck. We were lucky. After ten days of armed reconnaissance, we assumed that the flight routes were secure. This is why the pilots risked using the same flight routes for subsequent lifts. We later found out that the routes were not completely secure. Fortunately, most of the Iraqi soldiers along the flight routes were so intimidated by the sight of so many helicopters that they did not engage them. Even during subsequent lifts, the poorly disciplined Iraqi soldiers did not fire on the helicopters. In the future, we need to mass more combat power on the first lift while surprise is on our side. Otherwise, next time we might not be so lucky.

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WARNING (ORPT)
Flying over IRAQ without prior
approval is PROHIBITED.

TAA Campbell

MSR Newmarket

FOB Cobra

AO Eagle1

FOB Viper

IRAQ KUWAIT

OKP1

QIBNAH

BAGHDAD

KENAN

IRAK


KARAWIL

AL AMAROTAH

KUT ABQUH

AMWA2

AMWA1



Infantry Organization, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)

1st Brigade

1st Bn, 327th IN
2d Bn, 327th IN
3rd Bn, 327th IN

2d Brigade

1st Bn, 502d IN
Company A
Company B(-)*
Company C
Company D
HHC
2d Bn, 502d IN**
3rd Bn, 502d IN

3rd Brigade

1st Bn, 187th IN
2d Bn, 187th IN
3rd Bn, 187th IN

* Before deploying to Saudi Arabia, Company B released one platoon to serve as door-gunners for 9th Bn, 101st Aviation. Because of replacements during Operation Desert Shield, Company B's personnel strength rose to 112 with only two platoons.

** XVIIIth Airborne Corps reserve until G+4.

101st Aviation Brigade

2d Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment

- 3 Line Troops (each line troop has 6 OH-58's, 6 AH-1 Cobras)
- 1 Lift Troop (10 UH-60 Black Hawks)
- 3 EH-60 "Quick Fix" Black Hawks
- 1 Pathfinder Detachment
- 1 Long-Range Surveillance Detachment

1st Battalion, 101st Aviation (Attack)

- 3 Companies (each Company has 4 OH-58's, 6 AH-64 Apaches)
- 3 UH-60 Black Hawks

3rd Battalion, 101st Aviation (Attack)

- 3 Companies (each Company has 6 OH-58's, 6 AH-1 Cobras)
- 3 UH-1 Iroquois "Hueys"

2d Battalion, 229th Aviation Regiment*

- 3 Companies (each Company has 4 OH-58's, 6 AH-64 Apaches)
- 3 UH-60 Black Hawks

9th ID Aviation*

- 5 OH-58D's

4th Battalion, 101st Aviation (Medium Lift)

- 2 Companies (each Company has 15 UH-60 Black Hawks)

5th Battalion, 101st Aviation (Medium Lift)

- 2 Companies (same as 4-101)

9th Battalion, 101st Aviation (Medium Lift)

- 2 Companies (same as 4-101)

6th Battalion, 101st Aviation

- 3 Companies (each Company has 10 UH-1 Iroquois or "Hueys")

7th Battalion, 101st Aviation (Heavy Lift)

- 3 Companies (each Company has 15 CH-47 Chinooks)

XVIIIth Airborne Corps Chinook Company*

- 1 Company (15 CH-47 Chinooks)

* Indicates units not normally assigned to the 101st Airborne Division (Baer, Interview).


PZ Diagram
FOB Cobra

1st Lift

PZ 10


PZ 11

PZ 12



PZ C5 (External Loads)*

PZ C4



* PZ Controlled by 1st Brigade




FOB Cobra

2d Lift


PZ 10

PZ 11

PZ 12



PZ C5 (External Loads)



FOB Cobra

1st Lift

	<u>PZ_10</u>	<u>PZ_11</u>	<u>PZ_12</u>
Lead Aircraft	Co A	Co A 10, GLD 2, ADA HQ 2	Co C
2d Aircraft	Co A	TAC 2 (S-3)	Co C
3rd Aircraft	TAC 1 (BN CDR)	Bn Mortars	Co C
4th Aircraft	Co A	Bn Mortars	Co C
5th Aircraft	Co A	Co C	Co C
6th Aircraft	Co A		

	<u>PZ_C-4</u>
Lead Chinook	TACP HMMWV, TOW HMMWV, KL250 Motorcycle
2d Chinook	Cargo HMMWV, TOW HMMWV, KL250 Motorcycle
3rd Chinook	TOW HMMWV, TOW HMMWV

2d Lift

	<u>PZ_10</u>	<u>PZ_11</u>	<u>PZ_12</u>
Lead A/C	Co A	Co B 13, PPS-15 TM	Co B 10, HHC 5
2d A/C	Co A 13, Stngr TM	Co B	Co C
3rd A/C	Co A	Co B	Co C
4th A/C	Co A 9, HHC 6	Co B	Co C
5th A/C	Co B	Co B	Co C, Stngr TM
6th A/C	Co B 13, Stinger TM		

39 min PZ to LZ
 1 min in LZ
 47 min LZ to RRP
 10 min in RRP
 8 min RRP to PZ
 5 min in PZ

39 min PZ to LZ
 8 min in LZ
 47 min LZ to RRP
 15 min in RRP
 8 min RRP to PZ
 10 min in PZ

AIR MOVEMENT TABLE

TIME ZONE USED THROUGHOUT: AS OF 12 1700 FEB 1991

H-HOUR: -----(DTG)

COPY ----- OF -----

AVN UNIT	LIFTED UNIT	# LIFT	# SERIAL	# CHALK	SLING LOAD	PZ T/O	PZ NAME & LOCATION	LZ NAME & LOCATION	RP TIME	LAND TIME	REMARKS
TF 5-101	A 1-327	1	1	1-4		H-39	1 LT956741	1 <u>COBRA</u>	H-4	H-HOUR	LAND PZ 360
	B 1-327		2	5-11		H-37	2 LT967755	2	H-2	H+2	" 360
	C 1-327		3	12-16		H-35	3 LT971770	3	H+HOUR	H+4	" 360
	426, C2 PFOR, MED, CAY		4	17-23		H-33	13 MT026717	13	H+2	H+6	" 360
	A 2-327		5	24-29		H-31	6 MT018759	6	H+4	H+8	" 360
	B 2-327		6	30-34		H-29	5 LT996755	5	H+6	H+10	" 360
	C 2-327		7	35-39		H-27	4 LT993774	4	H+8	H+12	" 360
	B 3-327		8	40-46		H-25	8 MT050724	8	H+10	H+14	" 360
	A 3-327		9	47-50		H-23	7 MT036737	7	H+12	H+16	" 360
	C 3-327		10	51-54		H-21	9 MT057707	9	H+14	H+18	" 360

AIR MOVEMENT TABLE

TIME ZONE USED THROUGHOUT:-----

H-HOUR:----- (DTG)

COPY----- OF-----

AVN UNIT	LIFTED UNIT	# LIFT	# SERIAL	# CHALK	SLING LOAD	PZ T/O	PZ NAME & LOCATION	LZ NAME & LOCATION	RP TIME	LAND TIME	REMARKS
TF 5-101	A 1-502	1	11	⁶⁰ 55- 57		H-19	10 MT994727	10 <u>COBRA</u>	H+16	H+20	LAND PZ 360° LAND LZ 360
	B 1-502		12	^{61 65} 65-64		H-17	11 MT997725	11	H+18	H+22	PZ 360° LZ 360
	C 1-502		13	⁶⁶⁻⁶⁹ 65- 69		H-15	12 MT000221	12	H+20	H+24	PZ 360° LZ 360
TF 7-101	3-101	1	14	C1-C5		H-13	C5 MT015725	C5	H+22	H+26	PZ 020° LZ 360
	D 1-327		15	C6-C10		H-8	C1 LT925731	2	H+27	H+31	PZ 360° LZ 360
	1ST BDE		16	C11-C13		H-3	C5 MT015725	C5	H+32	H+36	PZ 020° LZ 360
	D 2-327		17	C14-C18		H+2	C2 MT018743	C5	H+32	H+41	PZ 360° LZ 360
	C 2-320		18	C19-C24		H+7	C5 MT015725	C7	H+42	H+46	PZ 020° LZ 360
	D 3-327		19	C25-C27		H+12	C3 MT033718	C3	H+47	H+51	PZ 360° LZ 360

AIR MOVEMENT TABLE

TIME ZONE USED THROUGHOUT:-----

H-HOUR:-----(DTG)

COPY-----OF-----

AVN UNIT	LIFTED UNIT	# LIFT	# SERIAL	# CHALK	SLING LOAD	PZ T/O	PZ NAME & LOCATION	LZ NAME & LOCATION	RP TIME	LAND TIME	REMARKS
TF	D										LAND PZ 360
7-101	1-502	1	20	C28-C30		H+17	C4 985724	C4	H+52	H+56	LAND LZ 360
TF											
2-159	2-320	1	21	C31-C35		H+22	C5 MTO15725	C5=C31+C32 C7=C33+C34 C8=C35	H+ 57	H+ 1+01	LAND PZ 020 LAND LZ 360
TF	1st										
6-101	BDE	1	22	H1-H7		H+24	13 MTO26717	13	H+ 59	H+ 1+03	LAND PZ 060 LAND LZ 360
QF	N/A	1		Q1		H+26	13 MTO26717	N/A	H+ 1+01	H+ 1+05	LAND PZ N/A
ACP	DIV	1		D1-D2		H+28	13 MTO26717	13	H+ 1+03	H+ 1+07	LAND PZ 060° LAND LZ 360°

AIR MOVEMENT TABLE

TIME ZONE USED THROUGHOUT:-----

H-HOUR:----- (DTG)

COPY----- OF-----

AVN UNIT	LIFTED UNIT	# LIFT	# SERIAL	# CHALK	SLING LOAD	PZ T/O	PZ NAME & LOCATION	LZ NAME & LOCATION	RP TIME	LAND TIME	REMARKS
TF	A	2	1	1-4		H+1+11	1 LT956741	COBRA	H+	H+	LAND PZ 360°
5-101	1-327								1+46	1+50	LAND LZ 360°
	B		2	5-10		H+1+13	2 LT967755		H+	H+	PZ 360°
	1-327								1+48	1+52	LZ 360°
	C		3	11-15		H+1+15	3 LT971270		H+	H+	PZ 360°
	1-327								1+50	1+54	LZ 360°
	A		4	16-20		H+1+17	6 MTO18759		H+	H+	PZ 360°
	2-327								1+52	1+56	LZ 360°
	B		5	21-25		H+1+19	5 LT998253		H+	H+	PZ 360°
	2-327								1+54	1+58	LZ 360°
	C		6	26-30		H+1+21	4 LT993774		H+	H+	PZ 360°
	2-327								1+56	2+00	LZ 360°
	A		7	31-38		H+1+23	8 MTO55722		H+	H+	PZ 360°
	3-327								1+58	2+02	LZ 360°
	B		8	39-42		H+1+25	7 MTO33735		H+	H+	PZ 360°
	3-327								2+00	2+04	LZ 360°
	C		9	43-46		H+1+27	9 MTO57222		H+	H+	PZ 360°
	3-327								2+02	2+06	LZ 360°
	A		10	52 47- 51		H+1+29	10 MTO994727		H+	H+	PZ 360°
	1-502								2+04	2+08	LZ 360°

AIR MOVEMENT TABLE


TIME ZONE USED THROUGHOUT:-----

H-HOUR:-----(DTG)




COPY-----OF-----

AVN UNIT	LIFTED UNIT	# LIFT	# SERIAL	# CHALK	SLING LOAD	PZ T/O	PZ NAME & LOCATION	LZ NAME & LOCATION	RP TIME	LAND TIME	REMARKS
TF 5-101	B 1-502	2	11	53-57 53-56		H+1+31	11 MT997725	11	H+ 2+06	H+ 2+10	PZ LAND 360 LZ LAND 360
	C 1-502		12	58-62 57-62		H+1+33	12 MT000721	12	H+ 2+08	H+ 2+12	" 360 " 360
	MED		13	63		H+1+35	13 MT026717	13	H+ 2+10	H+ 2+14	" 360 " 360
	D 7-101		14	C1-C5		H+1+54	C5 MT015775	2	H+ 2+29	H+ 2+33	" 020 " 360
	BOE		15	C6-C10		H+1+59	C5 "	C5	H+ 2+34	H+ 2+38	" 020 " 360
	D 2-327		16	C11-C15		H+2+04	C5 "	C5	H+ 2+39	H+ 2+43	" 020 " 360
	A 2-320		17	C16-C22		H+2+09	C5 "	C8	H+ 2+44	H+ 2+48	" 020 " 360
	D 3-327		18	C23-C26		H+2+14	C5 "	C3	H+ 2+49	H+ 2+53	" 020 " 360
	D 1-502		19	C27-C30		H+2+19	C5 "	C4	H+ 2+54	H+ 2+58	" 020 " 360

FOB COBRA



FAYDAT AS SADDAH



2-327

QUR AL BUSH

1-502
AHN S-3 Air

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE DISTRIBUTION.

SUBJECT: 5th Battalion, 101st Aviation Regiment SERE/SAR procedures.
(DRAFT)

1. General procedures.

a. When an aircraft is down due to enemy fire or major maintenance problem, the aircrew will immediately make a mayday call to their assigned flight on a common air to air frequency. If the aircraft is single ship, the call will be made on the Guard Emergency Frequency (243.0) and contain aircraft callsign and location. After identifying a suitable landing area, the aircraft will land, shutdown, and secure all sensitive items/equipment.

(1) Aircrew actions when down with troops. If an aircraft is down with a formation enroute to the LZ, the remainder of the flight will continue as briefed with the mission. The downed troops and aircrew will be recovered by the flight upon return from the LZ and with direction from the AMC. Single aircraft or aircraft down from a flight will initiate rescue procedures.

(2) Aircrew actions when down with no troops.

(a). In formation, the trail aircraft will follow the disabled aircraft to the ground. If the aircraft is ahead of the flot, trail will immediately recover the aircrew and annotate the location of the airframe. If the aircraft is behind the flot, the trail aircraft will ensure that a safe landing was made and render any assistance required. Coordination for recovery of crew and airframe will be made upon mission completion.

(3) Flight actions when an aircraft is down. One aircraft within the flight will monitor 282.2 until crew is extracted or the flight is mission complete.

b. If immediate recovery was not available, 5-101 DART will attempt recovery at 1 hour prior to sunrise and 1 hour after sunset. DART aircraft will attempt recovery in the vicinity of the downed aircraft, attempt to contact the downed crew on 282.8, and search for visual recognition signals. If downed aviator pickup points are feasible, they will be briefed prior to the mission.

c. AWACS are also available for coordination of recovery via airforce CSAR. AWACS should be considered a viable means of recovery for downed crews.

2. Rescue procedures. The following procedures should be followed to ensure the most expeditious recovery of the downed aircrew.

a. Immediately after landing.

(1) Assess the physical condition of personnel on board for life-

threatening injuries.

(2) Zero all secure equipment and navigation equipment. Destroy any sensitive/classified papers. Order for destruction of secure equipment or the aircraft will be briefed prior to the mission.

(3) Attempt initial contact.

(a) Transmit a 15 second beacon signal (243.0).

(b) Transmit an initial contact message on 243.0/voice frequency. Call will be a mayday call three times, tactical callsign and physical condition, repeat mayday.

(4) Immediately switch frequency to 282.8 and listen for friendly response. Authenticate all responses utilizing the letter of the week, word/number of the day, or joint authentication table.

(5) Ensure your location is accurately relayed to the friendly responding element.

b. No response to initial contact.

(1) Move away from the landing site to an initial hole-up site approximately 1/2 to 1 mile away.

(2) Avoid contact with the local population during the move.

(3) Do not attempt to establish contact with DART or AWACS until in concealment.

c. Arrival at hole-up site.

(1) Assess hole-up site security.

(2) Review preplanned SERE plan.

(3) Review premission intelligence briefing.

(4) Attempt another initial contact if the area is secure.

(5) Attempt initial contact calls on the hour until contact is made with AWACS or DART.

(6) If contact is made, monitor 282.8 for instructions each hour for 10 minutes past if contact was made with AWACS. Also, monitor 282.8 from 1 hour before sunrise to sunrise and sunset to 1 hour after for DART recovery. During this time, attempt a single call to the DART team (callsign prophet) and give callsign and location.

(7) Execute rescue/recovery procedures when appropriate.

(8) If contact is not made, execute SRSAT procedures.

* WARNING *

Do not attempt SRSAT procedures if enemy direction finding equipment is in the area of the holeup site.

(a) Activate the SARSAT system by setting the AN/PRC 90 to 243.0/Voice and transmitting your callsign and location (in UTM) and repeat callsign.

(b) Continue to transmit on 243.0 for 4 minutes by holding the transmitter switch open (cover the microphone with hand to prevent unwanted detection).

(c) Activate the SARSAT system during the satellite window.

4. Rescue/Recovery Procedures.

a. Proper authentication is mandatory for the receipt of assistance.

b. Isoprep information is the primary means of aircrew identification/authentication.

c. Word/Number of the day are alternate means of aircrew identification by CSAR and the primary means for other responding aircraft to include DART.

d. Night Recovery.

(1) The strobe light with blue cover will be the primary means for visual acquirement of aircrew.

(2) The strobe should only be turned on after proper authentication and CSAR/DART requests its use.

(3) If contact has not been made with a recovery aircraft, strobe should be turned on during DART window or any time a helicopter is heard.

e. Day Recovery.

(1) After authentication is accomplished or the downed aircrew has a positive ID of the aircraft being signalled, pen flares will be used in secure areas to signal rescue aircraft.

(2) VS 17 panel is primary visual signal ahead of the FLOT.

5. Actions on Contact with CSAR/DART.

a. Do not rush toward the rescue aircraft.

b. Remain in concealment until the helicopter has landed. Wait for the rescue aircrew to come to you.

c. Slowly approach the helicopter if the rescue aircrew does not immediately approach your position.

d. Do not make threatening movements.

6. Evasion.

a. If the aircraft is downed along an established flight route, the

aircrew will E&E to the nearest secure ACP along that route of flight (only if required to move due to METT-T). The decision to leave the aircraft's immediate location should be made only as a last resort. The chance of single individuals being seen in the vastness of the desert is remote.

b. Movement to an ACP or DAR should be considered if capture is imminent. Do not attempt to E&E through known enemy forces.

c. If the aircrew is downed in the vicinity of friendly forces, it is recommended that they attempt to link up with friendly forces should only be attempted if the location of those forces is known. Do not attempt to E&E through known enemy forces.

JOHN S. SAPIENZA
MAJ, AV
S-3

DISTRIBUTION:

Commander, 5-101 Ayn Regt
Commander, B Co
Commander, C Co
Commander, D Co